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LIBERTY, RELIGION
AND FLUORIDATION
George A. Strong*t
Although not a contagious disease,' dental caries-or tooth de-
cay-presently constitutes one of the most challenging health prob-
lems in the United States. Ninety-nine percent of the population of
the United States has some experience with dental caries by the time
they reach adulthood.2 Half of the population over 55 years of age
have no natural teeth at all.' A survey conducted by the Massachu-
setts Department of Public Health shows that the average child in
Massachusetts at the age of 14 has lost 1 tooth from caries and has
had 4 teeth filled with 7 others in need of filling.4 A survey of public
school children between the ages of 5 and 12 in Oakland, California,
shows more than 65 percent had suffered decay of their permanent
teeth.5 A 1965 survey indicated that two-thirds of the Head Start
children across the country were already in need of dental repairs.6
Most of these children were less than 5 years old.
Compounding this problem of dental health is a great shortage
of dentists, dental hygienists and assistants. It has been estimated
that approximately one-third of the population sees a dentist annu-
ally while 18 percent has never seen a dentist.7 A billion dental man-
hours would have been required in 1962 just to handle the then cur-
rent dental problems.' The dental manpower currently available can-
not physically provide for more than half the existing dental needs.'
Various methods of dealing with the problem of dental caries
have been advocated over the years. Fluoridation of drinking
* B.S. 1944, University of Notre Dame; M.A. 1952, University of California;
J.D. 1955, University of Santa Clara; Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Santa Clara Law School; Member, California and United States Supreme
Court Bars.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Patrick R.
McMahon, Associate Editor, Santa Clara Lawyer, in the preparation of this article.
1 Shaw, The Safety of Fluoridation, 28 POSTGRADUATE MEDICINE 641, 647 (1960).
2 Dunning, Current Status of Fluoridation, 273 NEw ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 30, 84
(1965), Reprint at 3.
3 Nathan and Scott, Fluoridation in California: An Unresolved Public Policy
Issue, 7 U. OF CAL. PUB. AIFAIS REP. 2 (1966).
4 Dunning, supra note 2.
5 Nathan and Scott, supra note 3, at 2.
6 Id.
7 Roemer, Water Fluoridation: Public Health Responsibility and the Democratic
Process, 55 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1338 (1965).
8 Nathan and Scott, supra note 3, at 3.
9 Dunning, supra note 2, at 8.
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water is by far the most noted method suggested. This article
attempts to assess the legality of fluoridation legislation in light
of its objectives and the criticisms that have been levelled against it.
Constitutional interpretation must be by analogy, for the most part,
in view of the absence of a Supreme Court decision dealing specific-
ally with fluoridation.
The first section of this article deals with the nature of fluori-
dation, its uses to date and its effectiveness. The second part
examines the contention that fluoridation is deprivation of liberty
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The final section
focuses on the argument that fluoridation impinges on religious
freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment.
I
Medically and scientifically sound,10 safe, efficient and economi-
cal, fluoridation has been described as one of the most significant
health measures of modern times."
Fluoride, as a caries preventative, was discovered during exten-
ded research on the cause of certain brown stains on teeth. These
brown stains or mottled enamel were discovered on teeth in areas
where the natural water contained a high concentration of fluoride.
Children in these areas had a high incidence of mottled enamel and a
correspondingly low incidence of tooth decay. Continued research in-
dictated that fluoride in the drinking water was the cause of both the
mottled enamel and the reduction in tooth decay. Subsequent studies
revealed that by controlling the level of fluoride in drinking water the
prevalence of dental caries in children could be greatly reduced and
mottling of the enamel could also be avoided. 2 This result, it was
found, could be best achieved by a fluoride level of between 1.0 and
1.2 parts per million.'3 This is generally referred to as the optimum
level.
Fluoridation reproduces in an entirely safe manner' 4 a situation
found in natural water supplies. Whether fluoride is naturally
present in the water or is added is immaterial.' 5 Once ingested
10 Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies, 55 J. Am. WATER WORKS 677 (1963).
11 71 J. Am. DENTAL ASS'N 1201 (1965). This issue of the Journal is devoted to
articles on fluoridation. For an early discussion of fluoridation in California see Dietz,
Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1952).
12 74 J. Am. DENTAL ASS'N 220, 231 (1967).
18 PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
FLUORIDE DRINKING WATERS: THE RELATION OF DENTAL CARIES TO FLUORIDE DRINK-
ING WATERS 83 (1962) ; Dunning, supra note 2, at 1; Shaw, supra note 1, at 642.
14 Dunning, supra note 2, at 11; Shaw, supra note 1, at 649; Smith, Safety of
Water Fluoridation, 65 J. Am. DENTAL Ass'N 598, 602 (1962).
15 Smith, supra note 14.
[Vol. 8
1967] LIBERTY, RELIGION AND FLUORIDATION 39
fluoride has been absorbed by the blood it is dispersed rapidly to all
of the body's organs. Approximately one half is stored in the skeletal
tissues.' 6 Some fluoride is deposited in the teeth while they are cal-
cifying. The mechanism involved is the replacement of hydroxyapa-
tite by the less soluble fluorpatite in the crystalline structure of tooth
enamel.'7 The most important effect of fluoridation is upon the for-
mation of tooth structure before teeth erupt into the mouth.'
8
Adjusting the fluoride content of a water supply to an optimum
level for the purpose of controlling dental caries was first commenced
in 1945 in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Newburg, New York. Evan-
ston, Illinois, followed in 1947. Reports from these test cities and
other communities indicate that fluoridation is indeed successful in
reducing the incidence of tooth decay. After 15 years of fluorida-
tion in Grand Rapids, total dental caries were lowered by 50 to 63
percent in children in the 12 to 14 age bracket, and by 48 to 50
percent in children in the 15 to 16 age bracket.' 9 With only 7 years
of fluoridation, Evanston experienced a 58 percent decrease in den-
tal decay among children in the 6 to 8 age bracket.20 A study
comparing dental costs for 6-8 year old children in a fluoridated
area-Newburg, New York-and a non-fluoridated area-Kingston,
New York-revealed an initial per capita cost of $14.16 in the fluo-
ridated area as compared with $32.38 in the non-fluoridated area.2 '
The maintenance cost for the following year was also substantially
less in the fluoridated area.22
At the present time over 60,000,000 people in the United States
drink water with the fluoride content adjusted to the optimum level
for the control of dental caries. 23 About 9,500,000 people live in com-
munities with adequate natural fluoride waters.24 The greatest single
increase in number, 8,500,000, was achieved in September, 1965,
when New York City began to fluoridate its water supply. In 1965,
Connecticut became the first state to require fluoridation; all public
water supplies serving a population of 20,000 or more were required
to be in compliance by October, 1967. Kentucky adopted a similar
measure in 1966.25
16 Id.
17 Dunning, supra note 2, at 3.
18 Id. at 4.
19 Id.
20 74 J. Am. DENTAL Ass'N 220, 236 (1967). This special issue of the Journal is
devoted to reports of findings in the Evanston Dental Caries Study.
21 Bernhardt, Fluoridation: How Far in 20 Years?, 71 J. Am. DENTAL ASS'N 1115,
1117 (1965).
22 Id.
23 Baker, Current Trends in Fluoridation, 71 J. Am. DENTAL Ass'N 1145 (1964).
24 Nathan and Scott, supra note 3, at 3.
25 Id. at 4.
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Practically all medical, dental and public health associations in-
cluding the American Dental Association and the American Medical
Association approve and recommend fluoridation of community wa-
ter suppliesY6
Although the above would seem to indicate rather compellingly
that fluoridation is a most desirable means of dealing with the
problem of dental caries, there is today a vocal and persistent oppo-
sition sharing quite a different view. 27 Fluoridation has been said to
cause everything from cancer to rust in water pipes. It is said to be
socialized medicine, a poison, the illegal practice of medicine, and
even a promotional scheme of the aluminum trust.28 The manifold
objections to fluoridation are not exactly unprecedented. Public
health measures of today such as vaccination against smallpox,
chlorination of water, and the pasteurization of milk, had vociferous
opposition before gaining public acceptance.
Although many of the objections to fluoridation are of the fan-
atical or crack-pot type, others are phrased in constitutional terms.
Fluoridation, it is claimed, is a deprivation of individual liberty with-
in the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and is violative of re-
ligious freedom guaranteed by the first amendment. The remainder
of this article examines the substance of these constitutional conten-
tions.
II
It is contended that fluoridation of the public water supply is
an unconstitutional deprivation of individual liberty within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. It denies the individual freedom of choice in a matter
relating to his bodily care and health by compelling him to drink
fluoridated water. The prevention and treatment of diseases of the
26 Other organizations include The American College of Dentists, The United
States Public Health Service, The American Water Works Association, The United
States Armed Forces, and The American Cancer Association. See Rogowski v. City
of Detroit, 374 Mich. 408, -, 132 N.W.2d 16, 19 (1965) ; Readey v. Saint Louis County
Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962) ; Nathan
and Scott, supra note 3, at 2. Also supporting fluoridation are such organizations as
The United States Junior Chamber of Commerce, The American Legion, The American
Federation of Labor, The Congress of Industrial Organizations, and The Parent
Teachers' Association. Bernhardt, supra note 21, at 1116.
27 Comments on the Opponents of Fluoridation, 71 J. Am. DENTAL Ass'N 1155
(1965).
28 The University of Michigan's School of Public Health has published Classifica-
tion and Appraisal of Objections to Fluoridation, by Elwell and Easlick, which cata-
logues and refutes over 150 objections to fluoridation. For a discussion of many of the
objections to fluoridation see Clark and Sophy, Fluoridation: The Courts and the
Opposition, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 338 (1967).
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teeth, it is argued, is a matter of private health, not public health.
Fluoridation therefore is allegedly an invasion of one's liberty to
treat his health as he thinks best. And it is likewise said to be a
denial of a parent's right to safeguard the health of his children.
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
not specifically addressed itself to the question of fluoridation, its
delineations of the scope of the fourteenth amendment in related
areas provide some guidelines. We do know that the personal free-
dom and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment is very broad. However, the constitution does
not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.' "Liberty im-
plies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reason-
able regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the
community."3
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,"' the defendant refused to sub-
mit to compulsory vaccination. He claimed that a compulsory
vaccination statute was unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
and that it was hostile to his right to treat his health as he thought
best. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute the Supreme
Court of the United States said,
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right
in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person
is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organ-
ized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based
on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted
with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under
the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each indi-
vidual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.82
The contention that fluoridation impinges upon one's liberty
as protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment involves an application of that clause "for its own sake.""3
29 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
30 Chicago, B. & O.R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911).
31 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
32 Id. at 26.
33 "[Ilt is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amend-
ment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation
which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the
principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth
is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the spe-
cific prohibitions of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate,
for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is con-
cerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational
basis' for adopting. . . ." Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
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Such a contention is not concerned with the application of the due
process clause as an instrument for enforcing the specific prohibi-
tions of the first amendment against the states. The liberty with
which we here deal is not a freedom which enjoys the preferred
position suggested by some Supreme Court decisions as belonging
to first amendment freedoms. 4
Inherent in the concept of state sovereignty is the state's right
to provide for the health, safety, and general welfare of the com-
munity. Legislation for the promotion of these ends has generally
been upheld where it is reasonable. If the legislative objective is
within the reach of the police power and the means adopted
reasonably related to achieving that objective, the measure is valid
provided it is not arbitrary or capricious and does not otherwise
contravene the Constitution of the United States." The question
remains whether the prevention of dental caries is properly within
the purview of the state's police power.
It has been said that the police power extends to all the great
public needs. 6 That the health and physical well-being of the
community is a public need and hence a proper object of the police
power is beyond question.8 7 "The preservation of the health and
physical safety of the people is a purpose of prime importance in the
excercise of the police power."3
The possession and enjoyment of all rights, including the liberty
secured by the fourteenth amendment, is subject to such reasonable
conditions and limitations as may be deemed by the state to be essen-
tial to the health of the community. 9 In upholding the constitutional-
ity of a Washington statute fixing the minimum wages for women,
the court, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, stated,
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health,
safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution
is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regu-
lation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process.
40
34 Readey v. Saint Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 629 (Mo. 1961),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962); Note, 12 Am. L. REV. 97 (1963); Note, 38 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 71 (1962).
5 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
36 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928).
37 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
38 Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, -, 52 N.E.2d 566, 570
(1943). See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 DI. 2d 504, -, 198 N.E.2d 326,
329 (1964) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Readey v. Saint Louis County Water
Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962).
89 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); Crowley v. Christensen,
137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890).
40 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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During the first third of this century the Supreme Court freely
used the guarantee of liberty in the due process clause to strike
down state economic and social legislation. A New York statute
setting the maximum number of hours of employment for bakery
employees was held unconstitutional as nothing more than a regula-
tion of the hours of labor." The Court pointed out that the statute
had no direct or substantial relation to the health of employees and
therefore could not be considered a health law, the indication being
that, had the Court found such a relationship to health, the statute
might very well have been upheld. On the other hand, the Washing-
ton statute fixing minimum wages for women was upheld in the Par-
rish case by a court that asked, "What can be closer to the public in-
terest than the health of women?"42
The recognition of community health as a proper subject for
the exercise of the police power, is especially appropriate when it
comes to the health of children. In Chapman v. City of Shreveport,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana said,
The health of the children of a community is of vital interest and of
great importance to all the inhabitants of the community. Their health
and physical well-being is of great concern to all the people, and any
legislation to retard or reduce disease in their midst cannot and should
not be opposed on the ground that it has no reasonable relation to the
general health and welfare. 43
When only one individual is involved, e.g., in the case of a
headache from sinus, a backache from lumbago, there is little diffi-
culty in classifying the malady as one of private health. There is no
question of the police power being invoked in such situations. But
the problem of dental caries is national in scope. The courts, in an-
swering the private health objection, point out that dental caries is
a serious and widespread disease which constitutes one of the most
important, continuing and unsolved problems of general health con-
fronting the community today.44 In Dowell v. City of Tulsa, the
court took judicial notice of the fact that the health of teeth bears a
direct relationship to general physical health.45
One court has said that whether a particular disease presents
a problem of public or private health does not turn on whether it
41 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937).
43 225 La. 859, -, 74 So. 2d 142, 145 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892
(1954).
44 Id. at 145-46. See also Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, -, 198
N.E.2d 326, 330 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965) ; Froncek v. City of Mil-
waukee, 269 Wis. 276, -, 69 N.W.2d 242, 246 (1955).
45 273 P.2d 859, 863 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955). Accord,
Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, -, 127 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1955), ap-
peal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956). See also Note, 3 ST. Louis U.L.J. 284 (1955);
Note, 13 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 38 (1956).
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affects a few or many or whether it is contagious, but rather on the
ability of public authority to effectively cope with it.
Under our modern existence the law must change and expand with
mechanical and scientific progress. What did not concern public health
yesterday, because of an inability of science to cope with the problem
at hand, may very well today become a matter of public health due to
scientific achievement and progress. The use of fluoridation to prevent
dental caries is an excellent example of this proposition. Science has
discovered a method whereby dental caries may be diminished. The
prevalence and danger of such caries are well known and the only
practicable application of such scientific knowledge is by treating
drinking water with fluoride. Thus the problem of dental caries has of
necessity become one of public health.
46
Closely related to the public-private health argument, is the con-
tention that inasmuch as dental decay is not infectious or contagious,
fluoridation cannot be justified as a proper exercise of police power.
Opponents of fluoridation are quick to point out that the Jacobson
case was concerned with compulsory vaccination against smallpox
where, apparently, there was a real threat of an epidemic. They
would restrict the Jacobson decision to cases of epidemics or threat-
ened epidemics. Courts which have considered this argument, how-
ever, have not been persuaded to so restrict Jacobson.47 The fact
that dental caries is not contagious is immaterial. What is important
is the fact that it is widespread, serious and affects the health and
well-being of the community. Protection of public health includes
protection from the introduction or spread of both contagious and
noncontagious diseases. 8
Nor has the argument that public necessity is a requisite for the
invocation of the police power found favor with the courts. 9 Like-
wise, the contention that compulsory fluoridation must withstand the
clear and present danger test has been rejected.5"
46 Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, -,127 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1955),
appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956).
47 Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 374 Mich. 408, -,132 N.W.2d 16, 24 (1965)
Readey v. Saint Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 662, 630 (Mo. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962); Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 863 (Okla. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955) ; Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, -, 292 P.2d
134, 137 (1956).
48 Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 225 La. 859, -, 74 So. 2d 142, 146 (1954),
appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892 (1954) ; Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, -,
277 P.2d 352, 356 (1954) ; Note, 4 UTAH L. REv. 416 (1955).
49 Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, -, 277 P.2d 352, 356 (1954). It
has been said that necessity is the limit of the legitimate exercise of the police power;
a reasonable exercise of such power is one required by public necessity. An examina-
tion of Words and Phrases establishes that in only a very few instances does the word
4(necessary" mean indispensable. Necessary means convenient, beneficial, appropriate,
suitable, relevant, helpful and desirable.
50 Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 630 (Mo. 1961),
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Since a valid exercise of police power must be in the interest of
the public generally and not merely in the interest of some particular
limited class,5' it might be contended that fluoridation legislation is
invalid since it primarily benefits children. As such, fluoridation leg-
islation would seem to be class legislation. Courts have held, how-
ever, that adults are also benefited in that children become adults.52
Not only does fluoridation reduce the disease in children, but its
beneficial results will also continue on into their adult life thereby
ultimately benefiting all." Moreover, one cannot say that parents are
not benefited by a reduction of the incidence of dental caries in their
children.54 The court in Chapman v. City of Shreveport answered the
class legislation argument in this way:
Children of today are adult citizens of tomorrow, upon whose shoulders
will fall the responsibilities and duties of maintaining our government
and society. Any legislation, therefore, which will better equip them,
by retarding or reducing the prevalence of disease, is of great impor-
tance and beneficial to all citizens. In our opinion the legislation does
bear a reasonable relation to public health. 5
5
Conceding then that dental caries presents a problem of public
health within the reach of police power, the question still remains
whether fluoridation of drinking water is a reasonable and rational
method of solving it. The Supreme Court of Illinois has said that
after considering all of the evidence they found "extraordinary ac-
cord" among professional and scientific authorities that fluoridation
is effective in reducing and preventing dental caries.5 6 In Dowell v.
City of Tulsa, the court said that the evidence established "without
contradiction, that [fluoridation] will materially reduce the inci-
dence of caries in youth.""7 And in Rogowski v. City of Detroit the
court took "judicial notice of the common knowledge ... that fluori-
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962) ; Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, -, 292 P.2d 134,
139-40 (1956) ; Note, 55 MIcE. L. Rzv. 130 (1956).
51 Readey v. Saint Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 630 (Mo. 1961),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962) ; Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, -, 292 P.2d 134,
136 (1956).
52 Readey v. Saint Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 632 (Mo. 1961),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962) ; Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, -, 292 P.2d 134,
136 (1956).
53 Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, -, 198 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, -,
127 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956) ; Froncek v. City
of Milwaukee, 269 Wis. 276, -, 69 N.W.2d 242, 247 (1955).
54 Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 863 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 912 (1955).
55 225 La. 859, -, 74 So. 2d 142, 145 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892
(1954).
56 Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, -, 198 N.E.2d 326, 332 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
57 273 P.2d 859, 863 (Okla. 1954); 8 OKLA. L. REV. 472 (1955); 1 WAYNE L. REv.
141 (1955).
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dation is beneficial to prevent dental caries and so improve public
health."58 This relatively strong language would seem to indicate
that the courts have had little difficulty in finding that fluoridation is
reasonably related to achieving a reduction in dental caries.
Conceding the effectiveness of fluoridation, there remains the
argument that it is nevertheless unconstitutional in that alternative
methods of reducing dental caries are available which would be less
restrictive of one's liberty. The availability of alternative methods of
achieving a permissible legislative objective does not force the legis-
lature to choose that method which is less restrictive of individual
liberty. That, of course, is an important consideration, but it is not
the sole criterion. Other factors such as efficiency, safety, conveni-
ence and costs are entitled to weight.5 9 The court pointed out in
Readey v. Saint Louis County Water Co. 0 that the city council, con-
fronted with opposing evidence on the issue, could have reasonably
concluded that alternative methods of achieving the purpose of fluo-
ridation were not as effective. Two courts have held that the fluorida-
tion of drinking water is the most practical and satisfactory method
of reducing dental caries.61
In the last analysis it becomes manifest that the choice of a
method to effect a reduction in dental caries is one of policy to be de-
cided by the legislature.
And while, as we have noted, such legislative action is generally sub-
ject to judicial review to determine whether it is related to and rea-
sonably necessary and suitable for the protection of the public health,
safety, welfare or morals, courts will not disturb a police regulation
where there is room for a difference of opinion, but in such case the
legislative judgment will prevail .... Furthermore, the wisdom, neces-
sity and expediency of police regulations are no concern of the courts,
but are matters primarily for the legislative body of the municipality,
and courts are without power to interfere merely because they believe
a different regulation might have been wiser or better.6 2
58 374 Mich. 408, -, 132 N.W.2d 16, 23 (1965).
59 Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, -, 198 N.E.2d 326, 333 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
60 352 S.W.2d 622, 632 (Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962).
61 Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, -, 127 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1955),
appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956); Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 864
(Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
62 Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, -, 198 N.E.2d 326, 332 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965). See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1951)
("If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine
which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective."); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). ("Even if the wisdom of the policy be re-
garded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its
judgment."); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905); Rogowski v. City
of Detroit, 374 Mich. 408, -, 132 N.W.2d 16, 23-24 (1965).
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The foregoing is an attempt to weigh the constitutional objec-
tions to fluoridation insofar as they relate to deprivation of liberty.
The sustaining or rejecting of such objections depends upon an ana-
lysis of the proper scope of the police power. If the prevention of dental
caries is a valid concern of the legislature, constitutional language
above cited, interpreting the police power, compels the conclu-
sion that fluoridation as a means of resolving the problem, is constit-
utionally permissible notwithstanding the availability of other solu-
tions. To say that dental caries is a purely private matter overlooks
the magnitude and seriousness of the problem. The statistics cited at
the beginning of this article bear testimony to the truly public nature
of dental caries. Finally, it is difficult to accept the idea that fluorid-
ation would constitute class legislation prohibited by the constitu-
tion. If the health of women is properly cognizable as a subject for
legislative action, it is hardly logically or otherwise defensible to
suggest that the health of children is beyond legislative reach.
III
Although fluoridation is an acceptable solution for dental caries
within the scope of the states' police power, there remains the objec-
tion that first amendment guarantees of freedom of religion pre-
clude state action."3 The Christian Science Church, for example,
teaches the sole reliance on the power of God for the cure of all phys-
ical and mental ailments. Since the church considers fluoride a drug,
as such it may not be used to treat dental caries. Therefore, fluorida-
tion forces the Christian Scientist to either abandon a tenet of his
religion or obtain nonfluoridated water outside the community sup-
ply. The propriety of forcing such a choice over the objection of a
constitutionally protected right of religious freedom necessitates in-
quiry into the nature of that right.
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. '6 4 This limitation upon the power of Congress ap-
plies with equal force against the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment. In interpreting this provision Mr. Justice Roberts
stated in Cantwell v. Connecticut,65
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has
a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
63 Nichols, Freedom of Religion and the Water Supply, 32 S. CAL. L. REV.
158, 159 (1958-1959).
64 U. S. CONST. amend. I.
65 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
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Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious or-
ganization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of
the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two con-
cepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that pro-
tection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not,
in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
It is not claimed that fluoridation of drinking water violates the
"establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment. Fluorida-
tion is said, however, to violate the "freedom to act" referred to in
Cantwell by Justice Roberts.
Before examining United States Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting the free exercise clause, decisions of the highest state courts
dealing with fluoridation and the free exercise clause will be consid-
ered. The Supreme Court of the United States has so far declined
review of fluoridation cases.
In Dowell v. City of Tulsa,6 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
rejected the contention that the ordinance in question prescribed a
form of medication or medical treatment forbidden by tenets of
certain churches. The court reasoned that fluoridation was no more
medication than a mother's furnishing her children with "a well-bal-
anced diet, including foods containing vitamin D and calcium to
harden bones and prevent rickets, or lean meat and milk to prevent
pellagra."67 The court also rejected an attempt to distinguish fluo-
ridation from chlorination on the basis that the latter treats water
whereas the former treats people:
[T]hey here argue that such treatment [fluoridation] must be distin-
guished from treatment with chlorides, because the latter will kill
germs, purify water and accordingly aid the prevention and spread of
disease, whereas fluorides will not. We think that if the putting of
chlorides in public water supplies will in fact promote the public health,
the distinction sought to be drawn by plaintiffs is immaterial. To us
it seems ridiculous and of no consequence in considering the public
health phase of the case that the substance to be added to the water
may be classed as a mineral rather than a drug, antiseptic or germ
killer; just as it is of little, if any, consequence whether fluoridation
accomplishes its beneficial result to the public health by killing germs in
66 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954).
67 Id. at 846. "Finally, neither the alliterative term 'compulsory mass medication'
nor reference to the fluoridated water as a 'concoction' describes the situation before
us; nor does the possible opprobrium, which may flow from their use, overcome the
police power." Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d 616, -, 277 P.2d 352, 357
(1954).
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the water, or by hardening the teeth or building up immunity in them to
the bacteria that causes caries or tooth decay.68
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Baer v. City of Bend"9 rejec-
ted the plaintiff's assertion that legislation which limits freedom of
religion is presumptively unconstitutional. An exercise of police
power is presumed constitutional when the object is permissible and
the means adopted are reasonably related to achieving the objective.
This presumption, however, has been questioned when legislation
affects substantive rights protected by the Bill of Rights. In his well
known footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co.70 Mr.
Justice Stone cautioned,
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth.71
After the Carolene Products Co. case the rights secured by the
first amendment were frequently said to enjoy a preferred posi-
tion.72 In 1956, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for five other
members of the Court said that "no constitutional guarantee enjoys
preference." 73 Nor, in his view, should legislation affecting first
amendment rights be presumed unconstitutional. In Kovacs v.
Cooper,74 he stated,
In short, the claim that any legislation is presumptively unconstitutional
which touches the field of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, insofar as the latter's concept of "liberty" contains what
is specifically protected by the First, has never commended itself to a
majority of this court.75
Even if a preference for first amendment rights is assumed, it would
seem that the usual presumption of constitutionality that attends leg-
islation generally would be sufficient to offset the preference, 76 leav-
68 Dowel v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 863 (Okla. 1954).
69 206 Ore. 221, 292 P.2d 134 (1956).
70 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
71 Id. at 152.
72 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 149 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942).
73 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
74 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
75 Id. at 94-95 (concurring opinion) "It has been suggested, with the casualness
of a footnote, that such legislation (affecting First Amendment rights) is not pre-
sumptively valid . . . and it has been weightily reiterated that freedom of speech has
a 'preferred position' among constitutional safeguards. . . . The precise meaning in-
tended to be conveyed by these phrases need not now be pursued." Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 526-27 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.) (concurring opinion).
76 Thomas v, Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
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ing no presumption either way.7 7 Consequently it would be incum-
bent upon opponents of fluoridation to show that such legislation is
an unreasonable and unjustified interference with the right of reli-
gious practice. 7
8
de Aryan v. Butler,71 the first fluoridation case to be decided by
a state appellate court, dealt very briefly with the religion aspects of
the problem. The court merely pointed out that the United States
Supreme Court, in discussing limitations on the freedom of religion,
has distinguished between direct compulsion imposed upon individ-
uals, with sanctions for violations and compulsion which is only in-
direct or reasonably incidental to a furnished service or facility and
which involves no penalty for violations.8" The court viewed fluorida-
tion as compulsion of the latter type.8 '
Although the courts of California, Oregon and Oklahoma have
sustained fluoridation legislation against the assertion that it infringes
religious freedom, their decisions cannot be considered determina-
tive of the question under the first and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution. At the same time, the Supreme Court
of the United States has declined to review any of the fluoridation
cases. Consequently, consideration must be given to those cases
wherein the Court has had occasion to interpret the free exercise
clause. Actually, most of the recent religious freedom cases decided
by the Court have dealt with problems of church and state-the es-
tablishment clause; relatively few cases have involved the free exer-
cise clause.
The free exercise cases decided prior to 1961, although impor-
tant to the development of constitutional doctrines in the restricted
factual situations involved, appear to be of limited value in delineat-
ing the scope, or extent, of protection afforded by the free exercise
clause.82
77 Baer v. City of Bend, 206 Ore. 221, -, 292 P.2d 134, 138 (1956).
78 But see, Nichols, supra note 63 at 171.
79 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 260 P.2d 98 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012 (1954).
80 Id. at 683, 260 P.2d at 103.
81 In 1957 the California Public Utilities Commission ordered a water company
to fluoridate its water saying, "We recognize that it is a fundamental constitutional
principle that a person is entitled to adhere to any religious belief which he may
choose. However, there is another principle which is equally true and fundamental-
that no person may, by exercising his religious belief, infringe the sovereign power of
the state to provide for the health, safety, or general welfare of its citizens. When
these two principles collide, the power of the state must prevail." City of Oroville v.
California Water Serv. Co., 17 P.U.R.2d 219, 221 (Cal. P.U.C. 1957).
82 Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), involved the distribution of religious liter-
ature in the streets in violation of statute. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944),
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103
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In 1961 the Supreme Court decided the case of Braunjeld v.
Brown"5 upholding Sunday closing laws of Pennsylvania. The appel-
lants, members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, contended that the
statute interfered with their free exercise of religion in that it forced
them to choose between giving up their religious observance of the
Sabbath or sustaining substantial economic detriment. The economic
detriment would derive from the fact that their religion required
them to close on Saturdays. Obedience to the challenged law would
necessitate closing on Sundays also. The Court rejected appellants
contention, emphasizing the secular nature of the statute: "the es-
tablishment of a day of community tranquillity, respite and recrea-
tion, a day when the atmosphere is one of calm and relaxation rather
than one of commercialism." 4 The statute according to the Court
merely operated so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive.85 This, then, was only an indirect burden on the ex-
ercise of religion. 6 The Court went on to say,
But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within
its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden.
8 7
The Court considered alternative means of achieving the State's
goal of a common day of rest and found them unacceptable. The al-
ternatives were impractical; created problems of enforcement; and
were contrary to the common custom of most people. 8 Moreover, the
State was not required to provide an exemption for Sabbatarians.
Such an exemption would be administratively unworkable and pro-
vide the exempted class with an economic advantage.
(1943), dealt with violations of ordinances requiring occupation licenses for peddling of
religious literature. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953), and Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 248 (1951) were concerned with discrimination against Jehovah's
Witnesses in the use of city parks. Although all of the above cases emphasized the free
exercise clause, the same result could have been achieved by reliance upon the rights of
free speech, free press, freedom of assembly or in the Fowler and Niemotko cases--
equal protection.
83 366 U.S. 599 (1961); (Chief Justice Warren announced the judgment of the
Court in an opinion in which Justice Black, Justice Clark, and Justice Whittaker con-
curred. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan rejected appellant's claim under the
free exercise clause in a separate opinion. Justice Douglas dissented. In separate opinions
Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart dissented from the disposition of the free exer-
cise clause claim.)
84 Id. at 602.
85 Id. at 605.
86 "To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes
only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make
unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of
the legislature." Id. at 606.
87 Id. at 607.
88 Id. at 608 (referring to McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-52 (1961)).
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The scope of the free exercise clause was further considered in
Sherbert v. Verner.89 The appellant, a Seventh-day Adventist, was
discharged by her employer for refusing to work on Saturday, her
Sabbath. Her application for unemployment compensation under the
South Carolina Unemployment Act was rejected because to qualify
she had to be "available for work" and her religion counseled against
Saturday employment.
In evaluating her claim of denial of the right of free exercise of
religion the Court said,
If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is
to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either
because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement
by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any
incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may bejustified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate."90
The eligibility provision of the act was found to impose a bur-
den on the exercise of her religion. It forced her "to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand."91 In effect it was a fine imposed
for Saturday worship.
The Court then considered the state's interest involved. There
was, of course, no question of the state's interest in providing for
unemployment compensation. Only the suitability of the means of
accomplishing the objective was in question. The state contended
that an exemption from the requirement for Sabbatarians might di-
lute the unemployment fund by encouraging the "filing of fraudulent
claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to
Saturday work, 92 and employers might be hindered in scheduling
Saturday work. The Court found that the state's interest in prevent-
ing fraudulent claims was not sufficiently compelling to justify the
infringement of appellant's right to the free exercise of her religion.
Consequently, the state had to grant an exemption to Sabbatarians.
The Court distinguished the Braunfeld case by pointing out that
there the Court had found that the state had a strong interest in pro-
viding for a common day of rest, that acceptable alternatives were
unavailable, and that an exemption for Sabbatarians would be im-
practicable.
89 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
90 Id. at 403. (The Court's quotation is from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963).)
91 Id. at 404.
92 Id. at 407.
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Whether Sherbert adds anything substantial to Braunfeld as a
statement of constitutional standard is questionable. Perhaps it is a
difference in emphasis. The distinction between direct and indirect
burdens on religion, although still considered, seems to have lost some
weight. More is needed to prevail over an objection of violation of
free exercise than the assertion of the secular nature of the state's
goal and a showing that a regulation is rationally related to some
colorable state interest." Whether the state's interest is sufficiently
compelling to justify legislation which limits the exercise of religion
will depend upon the resulting restriction on the free exercise of re-
ligion. The availability of acceptable alternative means of achieving
the state's goal which do not burden religion must be weighed on the
side of the individual's right to be free to practice his religion.
In applying the Braunfeld-Sherbert interpretation of the free
exercise clause to fluoridation legislation, it is necessary to evaluate
the nature and extent of the state's interest; the nature and extent of
the resulting restriction on the free excercise of religion; and the
availability of acceptable alternatives.
The state's interest in the fluoridation of the public water sup-
ply cannot seriously be questioned. The health of the population, and
especially that of children, has never been supposed to be beyond
the legitimate interests of the state. Mr. Justice Rutledge, speaking
for the Court in Prince v. Massachusetts said,
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with
all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and
dangers within a broad range of selection .... It is too late now to
doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is
within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to
control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary ac-
tion.94
Tooth decay, although not contagious, is an incurable, irreversible
and chronic disease of grave public concern.
Today, the problem is the conquest of chronic disease rather than
contagious disease. Health authorities have the same responsibility for
effecting the control of chronic disease with the best available scientific
knowledge that they have long had for communicable disease.95
The economic burden of poor dental health is not limited to the in-
dividual or the family. It falls as well, for example, on public health
facilities that provide dental health services, welfare departments
93 Id. at 406.
94 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944).
95 Roemer, supra note 7, at 1345.
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and even the military forces. In addition to the cost factor, the avail-
able dental manpower cannot provide for more than half the present
dental needs.
There is no question then that the state has a compelling inter-
est in the prevention of dental caries. "This is particularly true in
this day and age of increasing state concern with public welfare leg-
islation." 96
Inasmuch as Sherbert requires a balancing of the state's interest
and the individual's religious interest, it follows that the nature of the
religious claim and the extent of the burden must be evaluated. In
the context of the present problem, how essential to the claimant's
practice of his religion is the objection to the ingestion of fluoridated
water? Given the claimant's good faith, courts accept the individual's
characterization of his conduct or abstention as religious. Nonethe-
less, to determine the extent to which a government regulation bur-
dens religion, the essentiality of the religious principle to the prac-
tice of his religion must be evaluated. This evaluation must be made
in view of the factual context which gives rise to the claim of reli-
gious infringement.
Some are conscientiously opposed upon religious grounds to the
use of medication in the treatment of disease. Their religion teaches
them to seek the cure of disease in the power of God. They object to
the fluoridation of public drinking water because, in their view, flu-
oridation is mass medication. For their own purposes, they are cer-
tainly free to determine what constitutes medication. Are they equal-
ly free, however, to define medication if their definition substantially
affects the rights of others? May a community be denied the benefits
to be derived from the fluoridation of its water supplies by one
group's concept of what constitutes medication? And what if their
concept of fluoridation as it relates to medication is medically and
scientifically untenable? Medication is, of course, the application of
a medical substance for the treatment or cure of disease. However,
dental caries is incurable and nonreversible. 97 Once the dental enamel
96 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
97 Easlick, An Appraisal of Objections to Fluoridation, 65 J. Am. DENTAL ASW'N
124, 128 (1962), quoting a statement of H.T. Dean, Hearings on H.R. 2341 Before
the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 273-76
(1954); "'[Alny assumption that fluoridation is mass medication reveals a lack of
knowledge of the process of caries and its associated pathology. Medication implies the
application of a medicinal substance or agent for the treatment or cure of a disease-
the application of remedies. Fluoridation is not a treatment or cure for dental caries.
Dental caries produces a nonhealing lesion; dental enamel once injured never repairs
itself, with or without medication. Fluorine simply prevents the decay from develop-
ing. In short, fluoridation of public water supplies stimulates a purely natural phenom-
enon-a prophylaxis which nature has clearly outlined in those communities fortu-
nate enough to have about 1.0 ppm of fluorine naturally present in the public supply
of water, such as, Denver, Colo., Aurora, Ill., and others.'"
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of teeth has been injured it can never be repaired, with or without
medication. Thus fluorides have no curative effect upon existing car-
ies. Consequently, from the medical and scientific standpoint fluori-
dation, not being a treatment of disease, is not medication. And, al-
though the avoidance of medication may be an essential requirement
to the practice of a particular religion, fluoridated water does not of-
fend that requirement.
Again, it may be emphasized that no attempt is made here to
evaluate the verity of religious doctrine but rather to evaluate the ex-
tent to which a particular governmental regulation burdens or re-
stricts the free exercise of religion. The essentiality of a practice to
the exercise of a religion must be determined in order to evaluate the
alleged burden. Consequently, it may be asked, how essential is the
abstention from fluoridated water to the practice of a religion which
teaches the rejection of medication in view of the fact that practic-
ally all foods and natural water supplies contain fluoride?98 Appar-
ently, no religious objection is advanced against the ingestion of
fluoride found in natural water supplies or in food. It would appear
then, that there is no religious objection to fluoride as such, but
rather fluoride as medication. If there is no religious objection to
fluoride in milk or eggs because these foods are not ingested as a
medication, it must follow that there cannot be a serious religious
objection to fluoride in water. The fluoride in water can be equally
rejected as a medication. It would appear then that the abstention
from the ingestion of fluoridated water is not essential to the practice
of a religion which rejects medication.
In practical terms, the burden on religion comes down to this:
fluoridation imposes a condition on the enjoyment of services furn-
ished by a public facility; those who want to use water from public
sources must be willing to use fluoridated water and those who are
unwilling to do so for religious reasons must turn to private sources.
As in Braunfeld, the resulting burden on religion is only indirect.
Fluoridation makes the practice of their religion more expensive. Un-
98 McClure, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, FLUORINE IN FOODS, FLOURIDE DRINKING WATERS, 287-90 (1962). Approxi-
mately 7,000,000 people live in areas where the natural fluoride content of the water is
at optimum or above. Dunning, supra note 2, at 3. Of this number, about 1,000,000
are exposed to fluoridated water which is seriously above optimum. Some communities,
such as Bartlett, Texas, are actually defluoridating their water. Id. at 7. Los Angeles
and Houston have water supplies with a natural fluoride content not far from op-
timum. Id. at 10. See also PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE: NATURAL FLUORIDE CONTENT OF COMMUNAL WATER SUPPLIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1959). Fluoride is found in all foods in various degrees of concentra-
tion. For example, whole hen's egg, 1.18 ppm; fresh carrots, 1.30 ppm; and even
Cream of Wheat, 0.55 ppm. McClure, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FLUORINE IN FOODS, FLUORIDE DRINKING WATERS, 287-89
(1962).
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like Sherbert, however, an exemption for religious objectors is impos-
sible.
Finally, the availability of alternatives must be considered.
Several alternatives to fluoridation of the water supply have been
suggested and some have been extensively researched. Among these
alternatives are the topical application of fluoride directly to the
teeth, fluoride tablets, and the fluoridation of salt, bread, and milk.
The topical application of fluoride directly to teeth has re-
ceived extensive study. This process takes approximately one hour,
with the application of the fluoride solution to the teeth taking three
minutes. The process must be repeated four times at intervals of
about a week. All of the above constitutes one series. The topical
application procedure requires four series, at ages 3, 7, 10, and 13.1'
Where followed, this procedure has resulted in approximately a 40
percent reduction in dental caries.1 0 A 60 to 70 percent reduction
is expected from the fluoridation of drinking water.
The topical application method is vastly inferior to water fluori-
dation for several reasons. It is time consuming and expensive. This
method requires the conscientious cooperation of parents. Unfor-
tunately the lack of dental personnel precludes widespread success
even if parents were willing to cooperate. Consequently there is
no way to insure the success of this method.' 0 '
The use of fluoride tablets is another method that has been sug-
gested. Fluoride tablets have been used in two ways-taken as pills
or dissolved in drinking water. A recent study has indicated that
fluoride ingested in the form of a tablet is rapidly absorbed and
largely excreted within the first three hours with very little fluoride
metabolically available during the remainder of a 24 hour period.
Consequently, fluoride tablets are deemed unacceptable as a sub-
stitute for fluoridated community water supplies. 1 2 The major
benefits derived from the use of fluorides occur during the first
fourteen years of life during which time the deciduous and perma-
nent teeth are being formed. This means that tablets would have to
be taken daily for this extended period of time. Tablet taking is apt
to eventually, if not initially, lose its appeal to both children and
99 F. MAIER, MANUAL OF WATER FLUORIDATION PRACTICE 45 (1963).
100 Id.
101 Id.; Sognnaes, Relative Merits of Various Fluoridation Vehicles, in FLUORI-
DATION AS A PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURE 188-89 (J. Shaw ed. 1954) ; Dunning, supra note
2, at 10.
102 Stookey and Muhler, Laboratory Studies Concerning Fluoride Metabolism
Using Two Different Types of Fluoride Tablets, J. DENTISTRY FOR CHILDREN, Mar.
1966, at 100. The delayed-release type capsule more nearly duplicates the pattern of
fluoride metabolism from the use of fluoridated water. Id.
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their parents.' 3 Concentrated fluoride preparations, moreover, would
have to be varied from area to area depending upon the fluoride level
of the water supply. Such concentrates in the form of tablets also
constitute an accident hazard. The cost per person of tablets has
been estimated at $3.65 per year. This does not compare favorably
with the cost of fluoridating the water supply which is from 5 to
15 cents per person per year. 0 4
Fluorides in salt, bread and milk have also been suggested as
alternatives to fluoridation of water supplies. The problems here
seem insurmountable, there being no proof that fluorides incor-
porated in these items would be effective.'x" There is more variation
in the consumption of these foods than there is in the consumption
of water, making control of the effective dosage very difficult. The
addition of fluoride to milk would require extremely close super-
vision because of its natural fluoride content. This problem would
be greatly magnified by the numerous milk sources, especially in
large population areas."' There is the additional fact that fluoridated
milk would be quite costly. 7
The above discussion of alternatives of fluoridation does not
purport to be exhaustive. Other methods have been suggested, such
as bottled water, tooth paste, mouthwash and chewing gum. Unfor-
tunately, they all share in varying degrees the inadequacies dis-
cussed above.
It is apparent that there is no lack of suggested alternatives
to accomplish a reduction in dental caries. As a private approach to
the problem, however, they are expensive, inefficient and less effec-
tive. Because of the increased expense which is involved the alter-
native methods would not bring the benefits of fluoride to the chil-
dren of lower income families whose level of general health is usually
lower. As a public health measure, the alternative methods must
103 "In one study of a well publicized program in Hawaii free distribution of
fluoride pills was arranged, and 90 percent of the parents of children of appropriate
age were using the tablets during the early period of the study. Four years later ap-
proximately 12 percent of the parents were continuing to feed tablets to their
children." Dunning, supra note 2, at 9.
104 Id. at 7-8.
105 F. MAIER, supra note 99 at 47.
106 Wilkowske, Fluoridation of Milk?, 17 J. OF MILK ANn FOOD TECHNOLOGY
107-08 (1954) (editorial). The fluoride content of water can be analyzed by a rel-
atively simple procedure requiring approximately one hour. The analyses of milk, on
the other hand, necessitates evaporation, ashing, distillation of the fluoride and tritu-
ration requiring up to 24 hours. Cox, Is There a Case Against Fluoridation?, 35 J. Mo.
DENTAL Ass'N 8 (1955).
107 The cost of fluoridated milk for school children in New York City amounted
to $2.14 per child as compared to 10 cents for fluoridated water. F. MAIER, supra note
99, at 47.
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rely too heavily upon active individual participation and cooperation,
making them very inefficient. Centralized supervision and control
which is required to assure uniformity and safety is possible only
through the fluoridation of water supplies. Moreover, the alterna-
tives to fluoridation are inadequate as a public health measure be-
cause they cannot bring the benefits of fluoride to a sufficiently large
number of children. Fluoridation of the communal water supply is
the only acceptable public health approach to the problem of
dental caries.
It has been said "that no liberty is more essential to the con-
tinued vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees
than is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause
explicit in the First Amendment and imbedded in the Fourteenth."' °8
At the same time, it has never been said that religious liberty is
absolute. Religiously motivated conduct is not totally free from
regulation. The protection afforded by the Constitution is against
"undue" infringement by governmental action. The question in every
free exercise case then is whether the challenged regulation unduly
infringes one's right of religious liberty. It is apparent that in the
case of fluoridation, the infringement upon religion is minimal. Su-
preme Court decisions dealing with the free exercise clause, and
State court decisions dealing with fluoridation, compel the conclusion
that fluoridation legislation is not violative of religious liberty.
108 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (concurring opinion).
